We introduce the use of Fourier analysis on lattices as an integral part of a lattice based construction. The tools we develop provide an elegant description of certain Gaussian distributions around lattice points. Our results include two cryptographic constructions which are based on the worstcase hardness of the unique shortest vector problem. The main result is a new public key cryptosystem whose security guarantee is considerably stronger than previous results
INTRODUCTION
Cryptographic constructions based on lattices have attracted considerable interest in recent years. The main reason is that, unlike many other cryptographic constructions, * Research supported by NSF grant CCR-9987845.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. lattice based constructions can be based on the worst case hardness of a problem. That is, breaking them would imply a solution to any instance of a certain lattice problem. In this paper we will be interested in the unique shortest vector problem (uSVP), a lattice problem which is believed to be hard: we are asked to find the shortest vector in an n-dimensional lattice with the promise that it is shorter by a factor of n c than all other non-parallel vectors. Hence, the problem becomes harder as c decreases. The results in this field can be divided into two types. The first includes public key cryptosystems and the second includes collision resistant hash functions.
The only previously known public key cryptosystem based on a worst case lattice problem is the one due to Ajtai and Dwork [2] which appeared in 1996. They presented a public key cryptosystem based on the worst case hardness of O(n 8 )-uSVP. Then, in [8] , Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi showed how to eliminate decryption errors that existed in the original scheme. They also improved the security to O(n 7 )-uSVP. Although there are other lattice based cryptosystems (see, e.g., [9, 10, 13] ), none of them is based on the worst case hardness of a lattice problem. Our main result is a new public key cryptosystem whose security is based on the worst case hardness of O(n 1.5 )-uSVP. In [1] , Ajtai presented a one-way function based on the worst case hardness of several lattice problems. In terms of the uSVP, it was based on the hardness of O(n c )-uSVP. The constant c was not explicitly specified but later it was noted to be c = 19 [4] . In [7] , it was shown that under the same assumptions one can obtain collision resistant hash functions. These are stronger primitives than one-way functions with many uses in cryptography. Cai and Nerurkar [5] improved the exponent to c = 9 + and later, by providing an improved analysis, Cai [4] obtained c = 4 + . These papers also showed how to base the security of the hash function on other lattice problem which are potentially harder than uSVP (e.g., GapSVP and GapSIVP). In [15] , Micciancio recently constructed hash functions with the best known constant c for several important lattice problems (but not for uSVP). In another paper [14] , Micciancio improved the efficiency of the hash function by using cyclic lattices. Roughly speaking, all of these results are based on variations of a method known as Ajtai's iterative step.
Our contribution
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of Fourier analysis on lattices as an integral part of a lattice based construction. Fourier analysis was previously used indirectly through transference theorems, i.e., theorems that relate properties of a lattice and its dual (see, e.g., [4] ). Our constructions are the first to use Fourier analysis directly.
Our main tool is a reduction from the O(n 1.5 )-uSVP to the problem of distinguishing between two types of distributions on the segment [0, 1). We believe that this tool will find other uses in the future.
Using the main tool, we present three results. The main one is a new public key cryptosystem which is based on the hardness of O(n 1.5 )-uSVP. This is a major improvement to the 1996 cryptosystem by Ajtai and Dwork. Its description is surprising in that it essentially consists only of numbers modulo some large number N . Our second result is a collision resistant hash function whose security is based on the O(n 1.5 )-uSVP. In terms of the uSVP, this improves all the previous results mentioned above. However, previous results were not based only on uSVP and are therefore incomparable with our result. In addition, ours is the first collision resistant hash function whose analysis is not based on Ajtai's iterative step. The hash function that we consider is simple and is known as the modular subset sum function 1 . This function already appeared in previous papers; for example, one of the results in [11] is an average-case to average-case reduction for the function. The third result is related to an open question in quantum computation and will appear in the full version of this paper.
Intuitive overview
In the following we provide an informal overview of the results in this paper. Many of the details are omitted for the sake of clarity.
Main tool:
Our main tool is a reduction from O(n 1.5 )-uSVP to the problem of distinguishing between two types of distributions on [0, 1). One distribution is the uniform distribution U while the other T h is concentrated around integer multiples of 1/h for some unknown large integer h = 2
(we could easily distinguish between the two if we knew h).
The sharpness of the concentration depends on the factor of the uSVP problem. For example, O(n 1.5 ) translates to a concentration of around 1/n, that is, the difference between two adjacent peaks is roughly n times the width of a peak (see Figure 1 ). This tool is constructed in several steps. The first step involves a reduction from uSVP to a decision problem. Assume that the shortest vector is
where ai ∈ and v1, . . . , vn is a basis of the lattice. The decision problem asks whether p | ai where p is some prime number which we choose to be more than n 1.5 . The reduction is a Cook reduction and the idea is to make the lattice sparser and sparser without losing the shortest vector. At the end, the lattice is so sparse that we can easily find the shortest vector. For example, when p | ai we can replace vi with p · vi without losing the shortest vector. The actual proof is slightly more involved as we have to handle cases where p ¹ ai.
In the second step we reduce the decision problem to a problem of distinguishing between two n-dimensional distributions. Namely, one distribution is uniform and the other is a 'wavy' distribution. We begin by developing a few lem-mas based on a theorem of Banaszczyk. Essentially, this theorem says that if we choose a 'random' lattice point from the dual L * of a lattice and perturb it by a Gaussian of radius √ n then the distribution obtained can be closely approximated by a function that depends only on points in L (the primal lattice) that are within distance √ n of the origin. We apply this theorem for two types of lattices L. The first is a lattice L where all nonzero vectors are of length more than √ n. Here we get that the distribution around points of L * is determined only by the origin of the primal lattice and is therefore very close to being uniform. The second type is a lattice with one short vector u of length (say) 1/n and all other non-parallel vectors of length more than √ n. The distribution that we obtain here is almost uniform on n − 1 dimensional hyperplanes orthogonal to u. In the direction of u the distribution has peaks of distance n such that the width of each peak is 1. The way we use these results is the following. Recall that we are given an n 1.5 -unique lattice and we should decide whether p | ai. We do that by first scaling the lattice so that the length of the shortest vector is 1/n and therefore all non-parallel vectors are of length more than n 1.5 /n = √ n. We then multiply vi by p. If p | ai then the shortest vector remains and therefore if we take the distribution in the dual lattice we get a wavy distribution as described above. Otherwise, if p ¹ ai, the shortest vector disappears and since p > n 1.5 the resulting lattice has no vectors shorter than √ n. Therefore, the distribution obtained in the dual is very close to uniform.
The third and final step consists of 'projecting' the n-dimensional distributions described above to a onedimensional distribution. Naïvely, one can choose a point according to the n-dimensional distribution and project it down to a line. However, this would ruin the original distribution. We would like to project down to a line but only from tiny areas around the line. This would guarantee that the original distribution is preserved. This, however, presents a new difficulty: how can one guarantee that a randomly selected point according to the distribution in Ê n falls close to the line? We solve this by using the fact that the distribution is periodic on the lattice. Hence it is enough to consider the distribution on the fundamental parallelepiped of the lattice. Now we can draw a line that passes through the parallelepiped many times and that is therefore 'dense' in the n-dimensional space inside the parallelepiped (see Figure 2) . Projecting the two n-dimensional distributions above will produce either the uniform distribution U or the wavy distribution T h for some h. This completes the description of the main tool.
Public key cryptosystem:
Let N be some large integer. The private key consists of a single integer h chosen randomly in the range (say) 
The public key consists of m = O(log N ) numbers a1, . . . , am in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} which are 'close' to integer multiples of N/h (notice that h doesn't necessarily divide N ). We also include in the public key an index i0 ∈ [m] such that ai 0 is close to an odd multiple of N/h. We encrypt one bit at a time. An encryption of the bit 0 is the sum of a random subset of {a1, . . . , am} modulo N . An encryption of the bit 1 is similar but we add ai 0 /2 to the result. On receiving an encrypted word w we consider its remainder on division by N/h. If it is small, we decrypt 0 and otherwise we decrypt 1. Notice that since a1, . . . , am are all close to integer multiples of N/h any encryption of 0 is also close to a multiple of N/h and the decryption is correct. Similarly, since ai 0 /2 is far from a multiple of N/h, encryptions of 1 are also far from multiples of N/h and the decryption is 1.
The following is a rough description of how we establish the security of the cryptosystem. Assume that there exists a distinguisher A that given the public key can distinguish encryptions of 0 from encryptions of 1. In other words, the difference between the acceptance probabilities p0 on encryptions of 0 and the acceptance probability p1 on encryptions of 1 is non-negligible. Therefore, if pu is the acceptance probability on random words w, it must be the case that either |pu − p0| or |pu − p1| is non-negligible. Assume that the former case holds (the latter case is similar). Then we construct a distinguisher between the distributions U and T h . Let R be the unknown distribution on [0, 1). We choose m values from R, multiply them by N and round the result. Let a1, . . . , am be the result. We then estimate A's acceptance probability when the public key a1, . . . , am (for simplicity we ignore i0) is fixed and the word w is chosen randomly as an encryption of 0. This is done by simply calling A many times, each time with a new w computed according to the encryption algorithm. We also estimate A's acceptance probability when w is chosen uniformly from {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and not according to the encryption algorithm. If there is a non-negligible difference between the two estimates, we decide that R is T h and otherwise we say that R is U . We claim that this distinguishes between U and
Because of that one can show that the distribution of encryptions of 0 is very close to the uniform distribution and therefore A (as well as any other algorithm) cannot have different acceptance probabilities for the two distributions. Otherwise, R is T h and the distribution that we obtain on a1, . . . , am is the same one that is used in the public key algorithm. Therefore, according to our hypothesis, A should have a non-negligible difference between the two cases. Using A we show how to build a distinguisher between U and T h . We can assume that we have an estimateh on h up to some small 1/poly(m) error. We would like to useh to check if the distribution is concentrated around multiples of becomes huge when i is close to h (recall that h is roughly √ N which is exponential in m). The idea is to use the collision finding algorithm to create from T h a distribution which is also concentrated around the peaks i · ) to each x1, . . . , xm respectively. We denote the result by z1, . . . , zm. Now we call A with N · z1 , . . . , N · zm and we get a subset S such that È i∈S zi mod 1 is very close to zero. For simplicity assume that it is exactly zero. We then check if , as required. One last issue that we have to address is that A might not find collisions on inputs of the form N · z1 , . . . , N · zm when R is not the uniform distribution. That is because our assumption was that A finds collisions on inputs chosen uniformly. But note that if A does not find collisions we know that R has to be T h and hence we can still distinguish between U and T h .
Outline
In Section 2 we list several definitions and some properties of lattices that will be needed in this paper (for an introduction to lattices see [16] ). After defining several distributions in Section 2.1 we present the two cryptographic constructions in Section 3. The main tool of the paper is developed in Section 4. The analysis of the public key cryptosystem is in Section 5. The analysis of the hash function is omitted from this extended abstract. Section 6 describes a solution to an open problem related to quantum computation. Several technical claims appear in Appendix A.
PRELIMINARIES
A lattice in Ê n is defined as the set of all integer combinations of n linearly independent vectors. This set of vectors is known as a basis of the lattice and is not unique. Given a basis (v1, . . . , vn) of a lattice L, the fundamental parallelepiped is defined as
When the basis is clear from the context we will use the notation P(L) instead of P(v1, . . . , vn). Note that a lattice has a different fundamental parallelepiped for each possible basis. We denote by d(L) the volume of the fundamental parallelepiped of L or equivalently, the determinant of the matrix B whose columns are the basis vectors of the lattice. The point x ∈ Ê n reduced modulo the parallelepiped P(v1, . . . , vn) is the unique point y ∈ P(v1, . . . , vn) such that y − x is an integer combination of v1, . . . , vn (see, e.g., [13] ). The dual of a lattice L in Ê n , denoted L * , is the set of all vectors y ∈ Ê n such that x, y ∈ for all vectors x ∈ L. Similarly, given a basis (v1, . . . , vn) of lattice, we define the dual basis as the set of vectors
is the n × n matrix whose columns are the basis vectors then (B T ) −1 contains the dual basis as its columns. From this it follows that d(
. We say that a lattice is unique if its shortest vector is strictly shorter than all other non-parallel vectors. More-over, a lattice is f (n)-unique if the shortest vector is shorter by a factor of at least f (n) from all non-parallel vectors. In the shortest vector problem we are interested in finding the shortest vector in a lattice. In this paper we will be interested in the f (n)-unique shortest vector problem (f (n)-uSVP) where in addition, we are promised that the lattice is f (n)-unique. Let λ(L) denote the length of the shortest nonzero vector in the lattice L. We also denote the shortest vector (or one of the shortest vectors) by τ (L). Most of the lattices that appear is this paper are unique lattices and in these cases τ (L) is unique up to sign.
One particularly useful type of basis is an LLL reduced basis. Such a basis can be found in polynomial time [12] . Hence, we will often assume without loss of generality that lattices are given by an LLL reduced basis. The properties of LLL reduced bases that we use are summarized in Claim A. 4 .
We define a negligible amount as an amount which is asymptotically smaller than n −c for any constant c > 0. The parameter n will indicate the input size. Similarly, a non-negligible amount is one which is at least n −c for some c > 0. Finally, exponentially small means an expression that is at most 2
−Ω(n) . We say that an algorithm A with oracle access is a distinguisher between two distributions if its acceptance probability when the oracle outputs samples of the first distribution and its acceptance probability when the oracle outputs samples of the second distribution differ by a non-negligible amount. Note that the notion of acceptance is used for convenience. In addition, an algorithm A is said to distinguish between the distribution T and the set of distribution T if for any distribution T ∈ T , A distinguishes between T and T .
For two continuous random variables X and Y having values in [0, 1) with density functions T1 and T2 respectively we define their statistical difference as
|T1(r) − T2(r)|dr.
A similar definition holds for discrete random variables. One important fact that we use is that the statistical distance cannot increase by applying a (possibly randomized) function f , i.e., ∆(f (X), f(Y )) ≤ ∆(X, Y ). In particular, this implies that the acceptance probability of any algorithm on inputs from X differs from its acceptance probability on inputs from Y by at most ∆(X, Y ). The set {1, 2, . . . , n} is denoted by [n] . All logarithms are of base 2 unless otherwise specified. We use δij to denote the Kronecker delta, i.e., 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise. We usec to denote an unspecified constant. That is, whenever c appears we can replace it with some universal constant. For example, the expressionc + 7 =c is true because we can substitute 1 and 8 for the constants. Other constants will be denoted by c with a letter as the subscript, e.g., c h .
For two real numbers x, y > 0 we define x mod y as x − x/y y. For x ∈ Ê we define x as the integer nearest to x or, in case two such integers exist, the smaller of the two. We also use the notation frc(x) := |x − x |, i.e., the distance of a real x to the nearest integer. Notice that for all x, y ∈ Ê, 0 ≤ frc(x) ≤ 1 2 , frc(x) ≤ |x| and frc(x + y) ≤ frc(x) + frc(y). Recall that the normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ 2 is the distribution on Ê given by the density func-
. Also recall that the sum of two normal variables with mean 0 and variances σ . The Gaussian distribution is a distribution on Ê n obtained by taking n independent identically distributed normal random variables as the coordinates. A simple tail bound on the normal distribution appears in Claim A.1.
For clarity, we present some of our reductions in a model which allows operations on real numbers. It is possible to modify them in a straight forward way so that they operate in a model that approximates real numbers up to an error of 2 
Several Distributions
We define several useful distributions on the segment [0, 1). The distribution U is simply the uniform distribution with the density function U (r) = 1. For β ∈ Ê + the distribution Q β is a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance β 2π reduced modulo 1 (i.e., a periodization of the normal distribution):
Clearly, one can efficiently sample from Q β by sampling a normal variable and reducing the result modulo 1. Another distribution is T h,β where h ∈ AE and β ∈ Ê + (see Figure 1 ). Its density function is defined as
By adding a normalization factor we can extend the definition of T h,β to non-integer h. So in general,
For a real h > 0, choosing a value z ∈ [0, 1) according to T h,β can be done as follows. First choose a value x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , h − 1} and then choose a value y according to Q β . If x+y h < 1 then return it as the result. Otherwise, repeat the process again. It is easy to see that the distribution obtained is indeed T h,β and that the process is efficient for (say) h ≥ 1. We also define the following set of distributions:
where c h is a constant specified is Lemma 4.10.
CRYPTOGRAPHIC CONSTRUCTIONS
For a security parameter n, let N be 2 c N n 2 and let m be cmn 2 where c N and cm are two constants which will be specified later. Let γ(n) = ω(n √ log n), i.e., any function that satisfies γ(n) n √ log n → ∞ as n goes to infinity. The smaller the function, the better the security guarantee becomes. For concreteness, one can choose γ(n) = n log n. We also assume that γ(n) ≤ n cγ for some constant cγ > 0.
Public Key Encryption
• Private key:
. The private key is the number h.
• Public Key: We choose m values z1, . . . , zm  from T h,β by choosing x1, . . . , xm and y1, . . . , ym as described in Section 2.1. Let i0 be an index such that xi 0 is odd (such an i0 exists with probability exponentially close to 1). public key is (a1, . . . , am, i0 ).
• Encryption: In order to encrypt a bit we choose a random subset S of [m].
The encryption is È i∈S ai mod N if the bit is 0 and
mod N if the bit is 1.
• Decryption: On receiving w ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} we decrypt 0 if frc(
and 1 otherwise.
Collision Resistant Hash Function
• Choose m numbers a1, . . . , am uniformly in
Notice that if cm > cN then f indeed compresses the size of the input and collisions are guaranteed to exist.
MAIN TOOL
In this section we present a reduction from g(n)-uSVP to the problem of distinguishing between two types of distributions on [0, 1). Proof. Let p(n) be a prime larger than g(n) and at most (say) 2g(n). We can now apply Lemmas 4.2, 4.9 and 4.10 in order to obtain the theorem.
Reduction to a Decision Problem
We reduce the SVP to the following decision problem:
Decision SVP with parameter p (dSV Pp)
• Input: An arbitrary basis (v1, . . . , vn) of a unique lattice L and a number α such that
aivi be the coefficients of the shortest vector.
• Output: YES if p divides a1, NO otherwise. Lemma 4.2. Let p = p(n) > 2 be a prime number which is at most polynomial in n. 2 There exists a reduction from finding the shortest vector in a unique lattice L to dSV Pp. 3 Moreover, if L is an f (n)-unique lattice then all the calls to dSV P are also with an f (n)-unique lattice.
Proof. It is convenient to have a bound on the coefficients of the shortest vector. So we assume, without loss of generality, that we are given a basis (v1, ..., vn) of L which is LLL reduced. Hence, by Claim A.4, we get that the coefficients of the shortest vector satisfy |ai| ≤ 2 2n and
These are the only properties that we need from the basis and in fact, other bases used throughout this proof will not necessarily be LLL reduced. In the following we describe a procedure B(α) that finds the shortest vector given an estimate α which satisfies λ(L) < α ≤ 2λ(L). We apply the procedure n times with α = 2 j−n · v1 for j = 1, 2, . . . , n + 1. Notice that when we call B with the wrong value of α it can error by either outputting a nonlattice vector or a lattice vector which is longer than the shortest vector. We can easily ignore these errors by checking that the returned vector is a lattice vector and then take the shortest one. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that when α satisfies λ(L) < α ≤ 2λ(L), B(α) returns the shortest vector. Clearly, one can modify the dSV P so that it finds whether p | ai for any i ∈ [n] (and not just i = 1) by simply changing the order of the vectors in the basis given to the dSV P .
The procedure B is based on changes to the basis (v1, ..., vn). Throughout the procedure we maintain the invariant that the lattice spanned by the current basis is a sublattice of the original lattice and that the shortest vector is unchanged. Notice that this implies that if the original lattice is an f (n)-unique lattice then all intermediate lattices are also f (n)-unique and hence all the calls to dSV P are with an f (n)-unique lattice, as required. In addition, since the shortest vector is unchanged, the estimate α can be used whenever we call the dSVP with an intermediate lattice. The changes to the basis are meant to decrease the coefficients of the shortest vector. We let a1, . . . , an denote the coefficients of the shortest vector according to the current basis. We will show that when the procedure ends all the coefficients of the shortest vector are zero except ai for some i ∈ [n]. This implies that the shortest vector is vi. In the following we describe a routine C that will later be used in B.
The routine C(i, j) where i, j ∈ [n] applies a sequence of changes to the basis. Only the vectors vi and vj in the basis are modified. When the routine finishes it returns the new basis and a bit. If the bit is zero then we are guaranteed that the coefficient ai of the shortest vector in the new basis is zero. Otherwise, the bit is one and we are guaranteed that |aj | ≤ 1 2 |ai| and that ai is nonzero. In any case, the value of |ai| does not increase by C(i, j) .
The routine is composed of the following two steps. In the first step we replace vi with p · vi as long as the dSV P says that p | ai and not more than 2n times. By multiplying vi 2 The result holds for the case p = 2 as well with some technical differences. 3 One can guarantee the uniqueness of the shortest vector in any lattice by adding tiny perturbations to the basis vectors. Therefore, the assumption that L is unique can be avoided.
by p when p | ai, we obtain a sublattice that still contains the same shortest vector. The coefficient ai decreases by a factor of p. Since we began with |ai| < 2 2n , if this happens 2n times then ai = 0 and therefore in this case we return the current lattice and output a zero bit. Otherwise, we are guaranteed that in the current lattice p ¹ ai.
In the second step we consider p different bases where vi is replaced with one of vi − ai respectively while all other coefficients remain the same. Since p ¹ ai, one of the bases must satisfy that p | aj and we can find it by calling dSV Pp. We choose that basis and then multiply vj by p. We repeat the above steps (of choosing one of the p bases and multiplying by p) 2n times and then output the resulting lattice with the bit one. With each step, the new |aj | becomes at most (
. Hence, after 2n applications, the new |aj | is at most
and since aj is integer this implies |aj| ≤ 1 2 |ai|. This completes the description of C. It is easy to check that all the numbers involved have a polynomial size representation and therefore C runs in polynomial time.
The procedure B works by maintaining a set Z of possibly non-zero coefficients which is initially set to [n] . As long as |Z| ≥ 2 we perform the following operations. Assume without loss of generality that 1, 2 ∈ Z. We alternatively call C(1, 2) and C(2, 1) until the bit returned in one of the calls is zero. This indicates that one of the coefficients is zero (either a1 or a2 depending on which call returns the zero bit) and we remove it from the set Z. In order to show that the procedure runs in polynomial time, it is enough to show that an element is removed from Z after at most a polynomial number of steps. Notice that after each pair of calls to C that returned the bit one |a1| decreases by a factor of at least 4. Therefore, after at most 2n calls to C, a1 becomes zero and C(1, 2) must return the bit zero.
Although not used in this paper, the following is an immediate corollary of the above lemma and might be of independent interest. Basically, it is a reduction from the search SVP to the decision SVP for unique lattices. It is still an open question whether a similar result holds for SVP on general lattices.
Corollary 4.3. For any prime p = p(n) < poly(n) larger than 2 and any f (n) ≥ 1, finding the shortest vector in an p(n)f (n)-unique lattice can be reduced to the following gap problem: given d and an f (n)-unique lattice, decide whether the length of the shortest vector is at most d or more than
Proof. Omitted.
Gaussian Distributions on Lattices
Let Bn denote the Euclidean unit ball and define ρ(A) as
. The following lemma says that in any lattice L the contribution to ρ(L) from points of distance more than √ n is negligible.
Lemma 4.4 ([3], Lemma 1.5(i) with c = 1). For any lattice L, ρ(L
− √ nBn) < 2 −Ω(n) ρ(L).
A simple corollary of this is that ρ(L) < ρ(L∩
−Ω(n) ). We will also use the following formulation of the Poisson summation formula: 
For a given lattice L, we consider the distribution obtained by sampling a Gaussian with standard deviation 1/ √ 2π centered around the origin and reducing it modulo the fundamental parallelepiped P(L * ). Equivalently, we consider the following density function defined on P(L * ):
Intuitively, we can think of DL * as taking Gaussian distributions around 'all' points of L * . Since this distribution is periodic in Ê n with period P(L * ), we simplify the analysis by choosing DL * to be a restriction of the distribution to P(L * ). In this section we present good approximations to DL * for two types of lattices L. 
where {1} and {2} are due to Lemma 4.4 and the last inequality holds because ρ(L ∩ √ nBn) = 1. Multiplying by d(L) and using Lemma 4.5 we get,
We conclude the proof by integrating over P(L * ),
According to the following claim it is indeed a density function:
Lemma 4.8. Let L be a lattice with a shortest vector u in which all vectors not parallel to u are of length more than
where {1} and {2} are due to Lemma 4.4 and {3} is due to Claim A.2 with
(1) Consider the one dimensional lattice M spanned by the number u . Clearly, the lattice M * is spanned by the number 1 u . According to Lemma 4.5 for any a ∈ Ê,
Therefore,
We conclude the proof by integrating (1) over P(L * ):
Two Indistinguishable Distributions
Lemma 4.9. Let g(n) < p(n) be such that p(n) is a prime and both are at most polynomial in n. Solving dSV P p(n) on g(n)-unique lattices can be reduced to the problem of distinguishing between UL * and
).
Proof. We are given a basis (v1,
, i.e., the lattice spanned by the basis (
) and any vector not parallel to τ (L )
is of length at least
and therefore its length is in [
Hence, in this case all non-zero vectors are of length at least √ n. Clearly, we can take an LLL reduced basis of the lattice M without changing the properties of the lattice described above. Now consider the distribution DM * . We can efficiently sample from it by sampling a Gaussian centered around the origin with standard deviation
and reducing it modulo P(M * ). According to Lemma 4.8, if p(n) | a1 then the distribution is exponentially close to T M * ,τ (M ) . On the other hand, if p(n) ¹ a1, Lemma 4.6 says that the distribution is exponentially close to the uniform distribution UM * . Therefore, we can decide with non-negligible probability if p(n) | a1 by calling an algorithm that distinguishes between T M * ,τ (M ) and UM * . The error probability can be made exponentially small by calling the algorithm a polynomial number of times and taking the majority.
One Dimensional Distributions
Lemma 4.10. There exists a constant c h such that for any
) can be reduced to the problem of distinguishing between U and T g(n) . 
Proof
). An equivalent way to describe f is the following. For a real r ∈ [0, 1) let r1, . . . , rn−1 ∈ {0, 1 K , . . . ,
K−1 K
} and rn ∈ [0, 1) be the unique numbers such that r = r1
The set of points that are mapped to r is given by
Hence, S(r) is an n − 1 dimensional parallelepiped whose diameter is at most
Then, it is easy to see that for any r ∈ [0, 1) the point rw reduced modulo P(L * ) is contained in S(r). The line connecting the origin with w reduced modulo P(L * ) goes through the parallelepiped K n−1 times. The mapping f essentially takes each point in P(L * ) to a nearby point on the line (see Figure 2) .
The reduction works by sampling a point from the given distribution on P(L * ) and applying f , thereby obtaining a distribution on [0, 1). Notice that f can be computed efficiently. Clearly, by starting from a uniform distribution on P(L * ) we obtain the uniform distribution on [0, 1). Hence,
. The distribution that we get on [0, 1) is given by:
over S(r). We claim that by choosing K to be large enough this average is very close to its value in rw ∈ S(r). More formally, we claim that T1(r) is exponentially close to
where in the first equality we used the fact that τ (L), w is integer and that the function does not change if we change the sign of τ (L), w . By using the mean value theorem we get that for any r ∈ [0, 1) the difference between the maximum and the minimum values of T L * ,τ (L) over S(r) is at most:
where the inequality is due to Claim A.3 and the assumption that
. Hence, using Claim A.4,
and by choosing K = 2 3n we get that the statistical distance between T1 and
, w is integer and its absolute value is at most
for a large enough c h , as required.
ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC KEY CRYP-TOSYSTEM
Lemma 5.1 (Correctness). The probability of a decryption error is at most 2
−Ω(
) plus some exponentially small terms.
Note that the above probability is negligible since γ(n) = ω(n √ log n).
Proof. First consider an encryption of the bit 0. Probabilities are taken over the choices of the private and public keys and the randomization in the encryption process. Let S denote the subset of indices which are included in the sum and let w := È i∈S ai mod N . Since
and by the triangle inequality,
where the last inequality uses |N · zi − ai| < 1. Notice that frc(
where we used the fact that d is much larger than m. With probability exponentially close to 1, all xi's are strictly less than h − 1. Conditioned on that, the distribution of yi is Q β and the distribution of
. Therefore, according to Claim A.1, the probability of frc(
) and hence
which is less than 1 4 , as required. The proof for the case of an encryption of 1 is similar. By using the fact that xi 0 is odd and that with probability exponentially close to 1, frc(yi 0 ) < 1 16 we get frc(
. This, combined with (2) gives
and the proof is completed.
Before establishing the security of the construction, let us prove a few simple claims. Proof. Omitted.
Proof. Omitted. We denote the result by C δ (X).
Using the above definition, T h,β is a compression of Q β by a factor of h. Notice that if we can sample efficiently from X then we can also sample efficiently from its compression. This is done in a way similar to that used to sample from T h,β . put ((a1, . . . , am, i0) , w) where w is an encryption of 0 with the public key (a1, . . . , am, i0) and the probability is taken over the choice of private and public keys and the encryption algorithm. We define p1 similarly for encryptions of 1 and let pu be the acceptance probability of A on inputs ((a1, . . . , am, i0), w) where a1, . . . , am, i0 are again chosen according to the private and public keys distribution but w is chosen uniformly from {0, . . . , N − 1}. We would like to construct an A that distinguishes between the case where w is an encryption of 0 and the case where w is random. According to our hypothesis, |p0 − p1| ≥ In the following we describe the distinguisher B. We are given a distribution R which is either U or some
Note that neither h nor β are given to B. Our goal is to construct B such that the acceptance probability with U and the acceptance probability with T h,β differ by a non-negligible factor. We first chooseh uniformly from the set {1, 2, 4, . . . , √ N }. In addition we choose δ uniformly from the range [
) and s uniformly from the range [0, 7 1 (γ(n)) 2 ). Then, consider the distribution R = C δ (R + Q δ 2 s/N mod 1), i.e., we first add a normal variable to R and then compress the result by a factor of δ. We take m samples a1, . . . , am from N · R and let i0 be chosen randomly from [m] . We estimate p0(a1, . . . , am, i0) and pu(a1, . . . , am, i0) by computing many values w either according to the encryption algorithm or randomly and then calling A . By using a polynomial size sample, we can estimate the two probabilities up to an error of at most We first claim that when R is the uniform distribution, B rejects with high probability. The distribution R + Q δ 2 s/N mod 1 is still a uniform distribution on [0, 1) and so is R as can be easily seen from the definition of the compression. Therefore, a1, . . . , am are chosen uniformly from {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} and according to Claim 5.6 if cm is a large enough constant then with probability exponentially close to 1, the distribution on w obtained by encryptions of 0 is exponentially close to the uniform distribution on {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. Therefore, since A can be seen as a function on w, |p0(a1, . . . , am, i0) − pu(a1, . . . , am, i0 )| is also exponentially small and B rejects. Now assume that R is the distribution T h,β for some fixed h and β and we claim that B accepts with non-negligible probability. Then, according to Claim 5. . We now show that the probability on our choice ofh, δ, s that X happens is at least 1 poly (n) . First, with probability
h h √ N ). Therefore, conditioned on h ≤h < 2h, the probability that δh ∈ [ √ N , 2 √ N ) is at least 1 3 . Moreover, conditioned on h ≤h < 2h and δh ∈ [ √ N, 2 √ N ), the probability that frc(δh) < . To sum up, the probability of X is at least . Notice that conditioned on X, the distribution of δh and β + (δh) 2 /N is the same as the distribution of h and β in the choice of the private and public keys. Therefore the probability that (a1, . . . , am, i0) ∈ Y is at least P r(X) · P r (∃i0, (a1, . . . , am, i0 ) ∈ Y | X) · By combining the two lemmas above we get, Theorem 5.8. For c N ≥ 2c h and large enough cm, the public key cryptosystem described in Section 3 makes decryption errors with negligible probability and its security is based on √ n · γ(n)-uSVP.
QUANTUM COMPUTATION
In this section we state a result related to a problem in quantum computation known as the dihedral hidden sub-group problem. One reason this problem is interesting is because solving it might imply a quantum solution to uSVP [17] . In [6] , Ettinger and Høyer reduced the problem to the problem of finding an integer k given access to the distribution Z k where P r(Z k = z) = 2/N · cos 2 (πkz/N) for z = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. They presented an exponential time classical algorithm that uses only a polynomial number of samples of Z. Hence, a polynomial number of samples contains enough information to find k0. The problem of whether there exists an efficient algorithm remained open. Proof. Omitted.
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